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SELECTIVE NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS. By 
Robert Weir. New York: Oxford University Press. 1984. Pp. viii, 
292. $27.95. 
In April 1982, a Down's syndrome baby starved to death in a 
Bloomington, Indiana hospital when his parents refused consent to op-
erate on his blocked esophagus. 1 Court battles and publicity focused 
nationwide attention on Bloomington's "Infant Doe," but his fate is 
not unique. Each year thousands of newborns are denied life-sus-
taining treatment - even food and water - because they are mentally 
or physically handicapped. Doctors today can save children who once 
would have died naturally at birth, but when life-saving treatment sus-
tains a child with severe mental or physical burdens, doctors and par-
ents wonder whether to let nature take its course. The nontreatment 
dilemma is one of a society whose scientific development has outgrown 
the boundaries of moral consensus. Recently it has become the subject 
of ethical, religious, medical, legal, and legislative debate. 
Theologian Robert Weir's2 Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped 
Newborns is a significant contribution to this debate. Weir surveys the 
views of pediatricians, lawyers, and ethicists on selective non treatment 
and then proposes his own model for decisionmaking. The book's 
unique strength is its interdisciplinary approach - an approach which 
lays bare the complexities professionals and scholars must face when 
they peer outside their own disciplines at the broader social context. 
Ironically, Weir's proposed model ignores or evades many of these 
complexities, and that is the book's major flaw. 
Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns surveys medical, 
legal, and ethical opinions in the nontreatment debate. In the medical 
area, Weir begins by describing the dynamics of the typical NICU 
(Newborn Intensive Care Unit) and explaining common birth defects 
in lay terms. By informing his readers from the outset of the gravity of 
newborn handicaps and the uncertainties of prognosis, Weir equips 
them to evaluate scholarly debate with common sense. 
Weir goes on to compare the views of seven pediatricians who have 
written extensively on the question of selective nontreatment. Though 
the physicians surveyed all agree in principle to "do no harm," they 
disagree on the meaning of "harm." Physicians Raymond Duff, 
1. In re Infant Doe, No. 608204-004A (Monroe County Cir., Apr. 12, 1982) (declaratocy 
judgment), affd., Ind. Sup. Ct. No. 4821540 (sealed), cert. denied sub nom. Infant Doe v. Bloom-
ington Hosp., 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983); see generally Note, Withholding Treatment from Defective 
Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 224 (1983). 
2. Robert F. Weir is Professor of Religious Studies at Oklahoma State University, where he 
teaches courses on biomedical ethics. He is the editor of ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYINO 
(1977) and DEATH IN LITERATURE (1980). 
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Anthony Shaw, and John Lorber believe that "do no harm" implies 
nontreatment for newborns who lack the prospect of a "minimally ac-
ceptable quality of life." Doctors R.B. Zachary and Norman Frost 
think that doing no harm involves a detriment-benefit calculus: do not 
treat neonates for whom life's detriments outweigh its benefits. In 
contrast, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop maintains that doing no 
harm means treating all nondying infants, since death is the ultimate 
harm. Weir shows that even within the medical profession there is 
significant disagreement concerning who should make nontreatment 
decisions (physicians or parents) and what criteria they should use. 
Weir does a superficial job of pointing out the ambiguities and in-
consistencies in the legal response to the selective nontreatment prob-
lem. He briefly explores different views on the legal status of neonates, 
the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of main-
taining life, and the significance of direct killing versus letting die. He 
recognizes the gap between the criminal law on the books and in prac-
tice: though those withholding treatment may be violating state homi-
cide or neglect laws, no parent or physician has been successfully 
prosecuted for withholding medical treatment from a handicapped 
newborn.3 Weir presents the wide-ranging views of legal commenta-
tors advocating vigorous prosecution of nontreaters as murderers;4 re-
tention of the current system of nonenforcement, with the law on the 
books as deterrent;5 interpretation of the current law to allow circum-
scribed areas of legal nontreatment;6 and legalization of nonvoluntary 
active euthanasia in certain cases. 7 
Weir also presents a scathing criticism of the Reagan administra-
tion's recent attempts to resolve the legal dispute. Though the book 
was written before the most recent Department of Health and Human 
Services regulations were released, Weir's criticism of the first set of 
"Baby Doe Regs" still applies: even if the new rules are less vague 
than the old ones, federal executive intervention and surveillance is 
3. Weir points to the 1981 Mueller case (parents and attending physician were charged with 
conspiring to commit murder for withholding food from Siamese twin boys, but the charges were 
dropped for lack of evidence) and the 1975 Ede/in case (Massachusetts obstetrician's murder 
conviction for failing to ventilate an aborted but possibly viable fetus overturned on appeal) as 
situations where the gap between legal theory and practice occasionally narrows (p. 101). 
4. Horan, Euthanasia as a Form of Medical Management, in DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHA-
NASIA 219 (D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1977). 
5. Burt, Authorizing Death for Anomalous Newborns, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 435,447 
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976). 
6. A. HOLDER, LEGAL lssUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADoLESCENT MEDICINE 114 (1977); 
Grad, Legal Aspects of Informed Consent, in DECISION MAKING AND THE DEFECTIVE NEW-
BORN 443 (C. Swinyard ed. 1978); MacMillan, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreat-
ment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 620 (1978). 
7. Morris, Proposed Legislation, in INFANTICIDE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 221-27 (M. Kohl 
ed. 1978). 
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not the best way to handle medical care decisions for handicapped 
newborns. 
Weir's legal analysis is limited, though, by his complete reliance on 
secondary sources. Unlike his medical survey, which is grounded in 
reality, Weir's legal discussion lacks any reference to the distinctions 
courts are actually making and applying. As a result, his characteriza-
tions of court decisions are often inaccurate, superficial, or unrealistic. 
His suggestion that most courts faced with nontreatment cases have 
ordered treatment (p. 266) is misleading - the majority of reported 
opinions uphold parental refusal of treatment for handicapped 
newborns. 8 His statement that courts have so far protected the best 
interests of handicapped children (p. 140) does not explain how judges 
know what is best. Weir assumes that courts reach objective best in-
terest determinations without making comparative quality of life pro-
jections: an examination of recent court opinions suggests not only 
that this characterization is untrue, but also that it may be impossible.9 
Weir is at his best when surveying the attempts of ethicists and 
theologians to put together well-reasoned and consistent positions on 
selective nontreatment. In an effort to get beyond emotionalism, Weir 
presents the advantages and disadvantages of five ethical options: 
(1) treat all nondying neonates, 10 (2) terminate the lives of selected 
"nonpersons,"11 (3) defer to parental discretion, 12 (4) withhold treat-
ment according to quality of life projections, 13 and (5) withhold treat-
ment not in the child's best interests.14 While recognizing the intuitive 
or practical appeal of these approaches, Weir also points out their va-
garies, limitations and inherent subjectivities. Unfortunately, his pref-
erence for the "best interests" test leads him to overstate its 
advantages and to overlook its inherent problems: Whose objectivity? 
How is harm assessed if not relatively? When does the harm outweigh 
the benefits? 
8. See In re Infant Doe, Ind. Sup. Ct. No. 4821S40 (sealed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 
(1983) (upholding decision to withhold treatment, food, and water from Down's syndrome in-
fant); Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 467 N.Y.S.2d 68S, ajfd., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 
4S6 N.E.2d 1186, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. S60 (1983) (upholding decision not to treat infant born 
with spina bifida and other complications); In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 1S6 Cal. Rptr. 
48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding nontreatment of eleven-year-old Down's Syndrome boy with 
a correctible heart defect); see also In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 101S (La. 1982); In re Custody of a 
Minor, 38S Mass. 697 (1982). 
9. See cases cited at note 8 supra. 
10. P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 192 (1978). 
11. Tooley, A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION S1-91 (J. 
Feinberg ed. 1973). 
12. Fletcher, Choices of Life or Death in the Care of Defective Newborns, in SOCIAL RESPON· 
SIBILITY: JOURNALISM, LAW, AND MEDICINE 77 (L. Hodges ed. 197S). 
13. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229 J. A.M.A. 174 
(1974). 
14. Engelhardt, Ethical Issues in Aiding the Death of Young Children, in BENEFICENT EU-
THANASIA 18S (M. Kohl ed. 197S). 
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In short, Weir recognizes that physicians, lawyers, and ethicists 
have been talking past each other on the issue of selective nontreat-
ment. His multidisciplinary approach challenges participants in the 
nontreatment debate to develop standards and procedures that are 
sensitive to the complexities of individual cases but can be clearly and 
consistently applied. Theories must be evaluated in terms of their ap-
plicability to actual nontreatment dilemmas. Weir recognizes this 
need, and concludes his book with a proposed model for further dis-
cussion. But Weir's model suffers from the same problems of vague-
ness, oversimplification, and rigidity which he warns against in the 
preceding chapters of the book. 
Weir proposes that the standard for nontreatment decisions be 
"best interests of the child." He describes this standard as an objective 
balancing test which allows nontreatment only when the harm of 
treatment would outweigh the benefits to the child. His analysis is 
shallow, though, for in practice, the "best interests" test is as subjec-
tive as the "quality of life" projection he condemns. Harm can only be 
defined subjectively. The extent of harm is determined by comparing 
the handicapped child with a normal child - the quality of life com-
parison Weir himself criticizes. The harm/benefit balancing is also in-
herently subjective: to say that at a certain point the harm of 
continued existence outweighs the benefit is the same as saying that 
the life is not worth living. 
Weir first argues that unlike the "quality of life" test, the "best 
interests" test focuses solely on the interests of the child. However, 
actual applications of this test in court have included considerations of 
the family's capabilities and interests15 - considerations which Weir 
himself recognizes as "tragically necessary" in some cases (p. 215). 
Weir also argues that the "best interests" test focuses on the infant's 
medical prognosis. In reality an infant's handicap may affect his or 
her strictly medical prognosis, and, as Weir demonstrates in his medi-
cal survey, physicians often incorporate quality of life judgments in 
their medical recommendations. Weir's "best interests" test, which 
allows but does not admit subjective quality of life comparisons, di-
verts debate from the fundamental questions of whether or how soci-
ety should make such comparisons. 
Second, Weir labels newborns as "potential persons" with lesser 
claims to life than adults. His use of this label to rationalize what the 
legal status of fetuses and newborns has been, however, does not an-
swer the question of what their status should be. The concept of 
15. See, e.g., Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 456 N.E.2d 
1186, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 560 (1983) (dismissing challenge to nontreatment decision to avoid 
subjecting parents to the invasion of privacy and expense of litigation brought by a third party); 
In re Guardianship of Phillip B., 139 Cal. App. 3d 407, 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 792 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (earlier decision to withhold treatment from eleven-year-old Down's Syndrome boy may 
have been in the family's "combined best interests," but was not in the child's best interest). 
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nonpersonhood is no more than post hoc justification of non treatment 
(They don't kill persons, do they?). The real question is not what to 
call neonates, but whether to treat them. A more helpful way to ap-
proach this question might be to think of a continuum of human life 
from fertilization to brain death and to ask where on that continuum 
nontreatment is justified. 
Third, Weir makes a compelling argument that when treatment is 
not in the child's best interests there may be no moral difference be-
tween actively killing the child (i.e., by injection) and passively letting 
the child die. Where nontreatment would result in prolonged suffering 
(Le., starvation) a lethal injection is more humane. Weir's argument is 
weakened by his suggestion that there is a causational difference be-
tween killing and letting die. Not all patients allowed to die do so,16 
but not all attempts to kill are successful either. When death occurs, 
the responsibility for it is the same in either case. The fact that death 
is marginally more certain from active killing than from passive non-
treatment should not be allowed to obscure the similar moral content 
of the choices. In addition, Weir suggests that death is only intended 
when life-prolonging treatment is withheld against the child's best in-
terests. This analysis confuses intent with justification. Withholding 
life-prolonging treatment in the child's best interests intentionally 
causes death to mitigate harm. The appropriate argument is not that 
the killing is unintentional, but rather, that it is justified. 
Fourth, Weir proposes that neonatal treatment decisions be made 
on the basis of diagnostic categories of diseases. Weir claims that con-
genital anomalies can be divided into three groups: (1) untreatable 
diseases (treatment is futile), (2) treatable diseases which should not 
be treated (treatment is not in the infant's best interests), and (3) treat-
able diseases which should be treated (treatment is in the infant's best 
interests). Weir concludes that this system can be objectively and con-
sistently applied to nontreatment choices. He should know better. 
Medical diagnoses and prognoses, as Weir warns in previous chap-
ters, are tentative and complex. A disease like spina bifida spans the 
treatability range. Infants suffering from multiple anomalies may fall 
outside Weir's black and white categories. To answer, as he does, that 
treatment in "gray areas" is optional is to permit subjectivity and in-
consistency, to risk maleficence in individual cases, and to leave the 
most interesting questions unanswered. 
Weir lists examples of diseases which fall within each category, yet 
his alignment must change with technological advances. Ironically, he 
16. In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court authorized doctors to remove Karen Ann Quin-
lan from a respirator despite medical predictions that she could not live without it. In re Quin-
lan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). The comatose woman survived for nine years without the 
respirator. Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies 9 Year.s After Coma Decision, N.Y. Times, June 12, 
1985, at 1, col. 2. 
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lists "hypoplastic left ventricle" as an untreatable disease. In 1984 
doctors in Loma Linda, California kept an infant born with that con-
dition alive for a month by replacing her heart with that of a baby 
baboon.17 Rigid adherence to Weir's categorical rules would have de-
nied the infant, known as Baby Fae, even a chance for life. It would 
also have frozen medical science, by preventing physicians from ever 
learning how to treat what was considered to be an untreatable 
disease. 
In addition to being overly rigid, Weir's categories are also subjec-
tive. Most writers agree that the agony of children suffering from 
Lesch Nyhan syndrome (a process of neurological and physiological 
deterioration characterized by severe mental deficiency and self-muti-
lation) should not be prolonged. There is wide disagreement, how-
ever, on the treatment of diseases like Down's syndrome and spina 
bifida. Weir admits that one basis for distinguishing between catego-
ries is the degree of mental ("neurological") deficiency - a subjective 
assessment of the projected quality of life. 
Finally, Weir does a thorough job of discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of doctors, parents, committees, and courts as nontreat-
ment decisionmakers. Still, his proposed procedure ignores some 
practical problems. In Weir's model, parents are the primary deci-
sionmakers. Considering that the parents' choice is heavily influenced 
by the physician's prognosis and recommendation, the independence 
of their decision is questionable. Furthermore, though Weir advocates 
the use of hospital committees, under his proposed procedure, com-
mittees will rarely review nontreatment decisions on which doctors 
and parents agree. Social workers and nurses rarely raise official ap-
peals, and it is unlikely that people outside the hospitals will know to 
object. Weir's decisionmaking process could be alienating, time-con-
suming, and cumbersome (parents to doctors to committees to courts), 
and therefore inappropriate for NICU cases. 
Despite the shortcomings of Weir's proposed model and standards, 
Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns is recommended 
reading for anyone concerned with the nationwide dilemma in the 
NICUs. Its pages are rich with medical, legal, ethical, and emotional 
complexity. And its very failings challenge readers to suggest a better 
way. 
11. Baby Girl 'Stable' With Baboon Heart, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 28, 1984, § 1, at 14, col. 1; 
Doctors Defend Baboon Heart For Baby, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 29, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 3. 
